India - The Supreme Court is to examine as to "what constitutes an essential part of a religion with reference to a particular doctrine or religious practice followed by a particular community".
A bench comprising Chief Justice S. Rajendra Babu and judge P. Venkatarama Reddi made the reference Friday to a larger bench on a petition seeking review of its earlier judgement upholding the validity of Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowment Act, 1987, which abolished the hereditary rights of archakas or the priests who perform prayers in temples.
The bench was of the view that some of the observations under review were self-contradictory and that the whole approach was influenced by the basic assumption that religion should be equated to dharma or faith, "while this court enunciated the principles as to what is protected under articles 25 and 26 of the constitution" relating to religious freedom.
Article 25 of the constitution states "all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion". According to Article 26, "every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law".
The act abolished all rights - whether hereditary, contractual or otherwise - of any person who was an archaka or other office holder in any religious institution.
The Tirupati Tirumala Devasthanam challenged the provisions of the act and the Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld it and on appeal, the apex court confirmed the order.
However, A. Ramaswamy Dikshitulu and others filed a review petition contending that "a religious denomination enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the religion they hold and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in such matters".
Further, "if the tenets of a particular religion required performance of certain rites and ceremonies to be performed at certain times and in a particular manner, these could not be treated as secular activities; that protection under articles 25 and 26 was not confined to matters of doctrine or belief but they extended to acts done in pursuance of religion; that they contained a guarantee for rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which were an integral part of religion", it was submitted while seeking a review of the earlier judgement.
The bench said "considering the nature of contentions urged, the scope and extent of the same, we think, these are fit cases for consideration by a larger bench and we refer accordingly".