Boko Haram-Isis alliance is nothing but superficial propaganda

The pledge of allegiance offered to Islamic State (Isis) by the Nigerian terrorist group, Boko Haram, over the weekend, is a superficially impressive propaganda coup for the Syria-based Islamist extremist organisation, which has been collecting affiliates around the Muslim world like some people collect stamps.

But the new alliance, unilaterally proclaimed at the weekend by Boko Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, is unlikely to amount to much in terms of immediate collaboration on joint operations. It may, in fact, be more of a cry for help, given a recent string of defeats sustained by Boko Haram. Since January’s gruesome and well-publicised massacre in Baga, on the border with Chad, when it butchered hundreds of civilians, Boko Haram has faced a concerted push-back from Nigeria’s military and a nascent multinational force combining troops from Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin.

In the latest military moves, Niger and Chad said Sunday they had launched a “ground and air” offensive into Boko Haram-held territory in northeastern Nigeria. The attack followed the African Union’s decision on Friday to approve a regional force of 10,000 troops headquartered in the Chadian capital, N’Djamena, tasked with “eradicating the presence” of Boko Haram.

This evolving regional security alliance has political backing from the US, France, and Britain. But the western powers remain loth to get involved directly themselves. US bilateral relations have been complicated by concern over human rights abuses by Nigerian security forces. As Boko Haram has been forced on to the defensive, several key towns in Shekau’s self-styled caliphate have been recaptured by the army, including Baga, Gambaru, and the garrison town of Monguno. Chad’s president, Idriss Deby, claimed last week that he knew the whereabouts of the Boko Haram leader and called on him to surrender or be killed.

Latest reports from the area suggest the terror group is preparing for a showdown with the multinational force, and is concentrating its fighters in the town of Gwoza. Its random, murderous attacks on civilians continued at the weekend, when at least 54 people died and more than 140 were injured in suicide bombings in Maiduguri, capital of Borno state.

The squeeze on Boko Haram has also intensified due to the decision by Nigeria’s president, Goodluck Jonathan, to postpone nationwide elections until 28 March. This date has effectively become a deadline if not for defeating Boko Haram, then for significantly degrading its capacity for violence. Jonathan’s credibility, and his chance of re-election, rests in part on the outcome. Shekau had expressed interest in linking up with Isis in the past and has faithfully copied Isis tactics. He sent greetings and praise to the Isis leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, last year. In August he followed the Isis example and declared his own caliphate. Since then the group has made increasing use of social media such as Twitter and, like Isis, has produced sophisticated videos of beheadings, complete with deliberately scary soundtracks and voice-overs. Some observers have interpreted this as a sign of direct cooperation.

Analysts say the most obvious similarity between the two is their willingness to use extreme violence against civilians. This differentiates them from other jihadist groups, notably al-Qaida, which has eschewed such tactics of late. This propensity for mayhem has also made them the most feared among terrorist groups. In Isis’s case, its notoriety appears to have boosted foreign recruitment, especially among young European Muslims.

If Shekau believes Isis, which is itself under growing military pressure in Iraq and Syria from western air strikes and combined Iraqi-Iranian ground forces, will swiftly rally to his side, he will be disappointed. But although operational collaboration is unlikely at this stage, there are other, less obvious connections. In addition to ideological inspiration and propaganda tips, Boko Haram is thought to have obtained supplies of new weapons from its friends in the north – that is to say, from Isis affiliates or like-minded sympathisers in Libya, following the post-2011 capture of the Gaddafi regime’s arms depots by Islamist militias. According to western officials, Isis has a growing presence in Libya, based on Derna in the east. Last month it murdered 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians, an atrocity that led to retaliatory Egyptian air strikes.

Isis is also building up its profile in Egypt and Algeria, while ongoing instability in Mali, Chad and western Sudan is open to exploitation. Isis cells in Saudi Arabia and Yemen have been reported, while Taliban leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan and radical groups in south-east Asia have made similar pledges of allegiance to al-Baghdadi.

For Isis, Boko Haram’s offer of an ideological alliance is grist to its international propaganda mill, boosting its global profile. For Boko Haram, the shelter of Isis’s umbrella, and the ungoverned spaces of the Sahel, potentially provide productive new linkages to other Muslim world conflict zones in terms of recruits, weapons, finance, know-how, and intelligence. For western governments, this scenario conjures up their worst nightmare – the prospect of joined-up, globalised jihad.